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In Gordon v. Virtumundo, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit published its first opinion on private plaintiff  
standing requirements for actions under the federal CAN-SPAM Act. 
The court strictly interpreted CAN-SPAM’s enforcement language,   
rejecting attempts by professional litigants to insert themselves into 
CAN-SPAM’s limited private right of action. This Article analyzes 
Gordon’s treatment of CAN-SPAM’s private right of action and    
federal preemption provisions. It concludes by assessing the decision’s    
expected effect on future spam-related litigation. 
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The public furor over unsolicited commercial e-mail, known as 
spam, has fed a cottage industry dedicated to profiting from statutory 
damages codified in the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.1 Uncertainty about 
the scope of CAN-SPAM’s private right of action and limited 
precedent left courts largely powerless to dismiss such claims without 
expending significant resources on evaluating their individual merits. 
In its landmark Gordon v. Virtumundo decision, the Ninth Circuit 
erased many, but not all, of these ambiguities. It derived eligibility 
from legislative intent and held that CAN-SPAM’s private standing 
requirements should be narrowly construed.2 The court also held that 
eligible private plaintiffs must demonstrate actual harm of a specific 
type and causation.3 Finally, the court determined that CAN-SPAM’s 
preemption clause was broad, only allowing spam-related litigation  
under state law if the violation materially and intentionally references 
the state law at issue and the law itself specifically relates to falsity or     
deception.4 Gordon largely shuts out professional plaintiffs from CAN-
SPAM eligibility. It also modifies the requirements for legitimate   
claimants, necessitating a change in litigation approach. 
 
I. THE CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003 
 
Unsolicited bulk and commercial e-mail messages, known as spam, 
are sent in large quantities to indiscriminate sets of recipients. During 
the first half of 2009, spam constituted 85.5% of all e-mail traffic.5 
                                                                                                             
1 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-
SPAM) Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006); See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Serial 
Anti-Spam Lawsuit Filer Loses Appeal . . . And His Possessions, TECHDIRT (Aug. 24, 2009, 
10:25 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles /20090821/0334155954.shtml. 
2 See Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009). 
3 See id. at 1053-54. 
4 See id. at 1063. 
5 Kaspersky - Spam Volume Remained High in H1 2009 Despite Economic Crisis, 
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This ever-rising tide of spam has caused public consternation and high 
business spending toward network and business asset protection.6   
Legislators balanced this public sentiment with the economic and 
marketing utility of legitimate commercial e-mail when they drafted 
and subsequently enacted CAN-SPAM in 2003.7 
CAN-SPAM governs the content, representation, and delivery of 
commercial e-mail.8 It does not outlaw unsolicited e-mail outright. 
Commercial e-mail is only unlawful if it does not allow for verifiable 
and timely user-initiated unsubscription,9 contains inaccurate or     
misleading sender information,10 or is sent under or through falsified 
means.11 CAN-SPAM also limits standing to governmental and regula-
tory bodies, but provides a limited private right of action to a class of 
plaintiffs it terms Internet access services (“IASs”).12 The term “Internet 
access service” is statutorily defined as “a service that enables users to 
access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered 
over the Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, 
information, and other services as part of a package of services offered 
to consumers.”13 In the absence of precedent, this language was suffi-
ciently ambiguous to cause most courts to construe the definition very 
                                                                                                             
SPAM FIGHTER (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.spamfighter.com/News-13076-Kaspersky-
%E2%80%93-Spam-Volume-Remained-High-in-H1-2009-Despite-Economic-
Crisis.htm 
6 See Rebecca Lieb, Make Spammers Pay Before You Do, ISP-PLANET (Jul. 31, 
2002), http://www.ispplanet.com/business/2002/spam_cost.html. 
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2006). 
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 7702(2) (2006). 
9 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006). 
10 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2) (2006). 
11 See 15 U.S.C § 7704(b) (2006). 
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(1) (2006). 
13 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(4) (2006). 
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broadly.14  
IASs are only granted CAN-SPAM standing if they suffer adverse 
effects as a result of a substantive CAN-SPAM violation.15 The courts 
generally construed CAN-SPAM’s “adverse effects” language to require 
a showing of both sufficient extent of harm as well as type of harm 
generally suffered by IASs.16 However, the courts broadly refused to 
require a showing of any connection between specific violations and 
alleged harm.17 
The Act provides for statutory damages of up to $100 per violating 
message18 and $1,000,000 in aggregate.19 It allows treble damages for 
aggregated or willful violations.20 The Act also preempts related state 
law that “expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send       
commercial messages, except to the extent that [it] prohibits falsity or      
deception.”21 State laws not specific to electronic mail are saved from 
preemption, as are laws addressing fraud or computer crime.22  
Between CAN-SPAM’s steep statutory damages, the ease of meet-
ing its standing requirements, and widespread public hatred for spam, 
it is easy to see how an unscrupulous private plaintiff could make a 
significant amount of money by manipulating the previous regime. 
                                                                                                             
14 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Quinstreet, No. C07-5378RJB, 2008 WL 3166307, at *5 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 2008) (in the absence of guidance, the term must be given its 
broadest definition under CAN-SPAM); MySpace v. The Globe.com, No. CV06-
3391-RGK(JCx), 2007 WL 1686966, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007) (IAS providers 
can include any traditional ISP, any e-mail provider, and most Web site owners); 
Hypertouch v. Kennedy-Western Univ., No. C04-05203SI, 2006 WL 648688, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2006) (holding that providing e-mail service alone, without any 
other services, was sufficient to qualify as an IAS under CAN-SPAM). 
15 See, e.g., Ferguson, 2008 WL 3166307; MySpace, 2007 WL 1686966, at *3; 
Hypertouch, 2006 WL 648688, at *3. 
16 See, e.g., ASIS Internet Servs. v. Optin Global, No. C-05-05124JCS, 2008 WL 
1902217, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2008); Brosnan v. Alki Mortgage, No. 
C074339JL, 2008 WL 413732, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008); Hypertouch, 2006 WL 
648688, at *4. 
17 See, e.g., Optin Global, 2008 WL 1902217, at *5-6. 
18 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3)(A)(i) (2006). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3)(B) (2006). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(3)(C) (2006). 
21 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (2006). 
22 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(2) (2006). 
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One CAN-SPAM defendant complained somewhat prophetically that 
such “a broad interpretation [would] create a flood of suits by ‘spam 
litigation mills.’”23 
 
II. THE GORDON DECISION 
 
The Ninth Circuit chilled the potential anti-spam litigation indus-
try with its decision in Gordon.24 Appellant James S. Gordon was      
variously described as an “anti-spam enthusiast” and “professional 
plaintiff,” whose sole source of income was monetary settlements from 
his litigation campaign.25 His technique was to configure several Inter-
net domains and e-mail inboxes under his control to not only passively 
accept spam but also to actively seek it. Once spam messages began  
arriving, Gordon would sue the senders or relaying providers. One 
such provider was Virtumundo, Inc., an e-mail marketing firm. 
The district court determined that Gordon lacked CAN-SPAM 
standing and granted Virtumundo’s motion for summary judgment.26 
It held that while Gordon qualified as an IAS under the prevailing  
definition of the term,27 he failed to show adverse harm because any 
harm he suffered was the same as that suffered by ordinary e-mail    
users.28 The court further held that since Virtumundo did nothing to 
hide its e-mail domains from end-users, it did not materially falsify or 
deceive, thus negating any claim Gordon might have had under state 
law via CAN-SPAM’s preemption exception.29 
Gordon appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in a strongly worded and 
decisive ruling. First, it explicitly rejected a broad interpretation of the 
                                                                                                             
23 ASIS Internet Servs. v. Active Response, No. C076211TEH, 2008 WL 
2952809, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 30, 2008) (quoting defendant). 
24 See Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2009). 
25 Id. at 1056. 
26 See Gordon v. Virtumundo, No. 06-0204-JCC, 2007 WL 1459395, at *15 
(W.D. Wash. May 15, 2007). 
27 See id. at 8. 
28 See id.  
29 See id. at 12. 
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definition of IAS.30 Although the court noted that the actual definition 
of IAS may have a technical or hardware prerequisite, it refused to set 
forth any general test or definitional boundaries.31 Nevertheless, the 
court considered CAN-SPAM’s legislative intent and determined that a 
plaintiff was not an IAS because it had no control over the serving 
hardware and did not provide any service the service provider could 
not offer. As Gordon provided no actual services beyond what was  
already freely available to his “customers,” the court determined that 
he did not qualify as an IAS. 
Second, the Ninth Circuit added a two-part extent of harm          
requirement to the existing “adversely affected” test, which only neces-
sitated showing adequate type of harm. The resulting test has three 
elements: (1) that there be, “at bare minimum, a demonstrated rela-
tionship between purported harms and the type of e-mail practices  
regulated by the Act,”32 (2) the type of harm suffered must be “both 
real and of the type experienced by ISPs,”33 and (3) any ISP-type harm 
suffered must be above and beyond the ordinary difficulties suffered by 
the normal operation of the ISP, even after normal reasonable precau-
tions to avoid them.34 Gordon failed on all counts. He could not   
proffer evidence of a connection between spam and his purported 
harms; he only suffered harm of the type ordinarily incurred by ordi-
nary consumers. Even if he could meet the first two criteria, his efforts 
in actually attracting spam could not be construed as reasonable     
precautions to avoid it. The court noted that, for fear of creating an 
impossibly high standard, it was not requiring direct evidence of harm 
from specific e-mails. It merely required evidence of general harm of the 
correct type and extent.35  
Finally, citing Omega Travel v. Mummagraphics, the Gordon court 
                                                                                                             
30 See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1051. 
31 See id. at 1052. 
32 Id. at 1054. 
33 Id. at 1053. 
34 Id. at 1054. 
35 See id. at 1054 n.12. While the court noted the impracticability of tracing 
harm to a specific set of offending e-mails, it did not offer concrete examples of what 
it considered to be sufficiently harmful. Instead, the court reserved the future possi-
bility of requiring evidence of specific e-mails causing alleged harm. 
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held that not only did Gordon’s state claims fail to qualify for CAN-
SPAM’s preemption exception, but the state law itself was pre-
empted.36 The court seized on CAN-SPAM’s stated legislative intent 
that the act regulate commercial e-mail “on a nationwide basis”37 and 
only excepted state laws that “target fraud or deception.”38 The Omega 
court did not find that state laws prohibiting “mere error” or “insigni-
ficant inaccuracies” qualified as exceptions to preemption.39 The Gor-
don court found that the state law in question, Washington’s 
Commercial Electronic Mail Act (CEMA),40 was substantially aimed at 
the same goals as CAN-SPAM and was thus preempted, regardless of 
CEMA’s incidental language treating falsity or deception.41 Such     
language, the court opined, left open the possibility of violation by   
inaccuracy, rather than intent, and thus ran afoul of Omega’s preemp-
tion of statutes punishing “mere error” or technicalities.42 In Gordon’s 
case, because Virtumundo did nothing to hide the identity of its         
e-mails from discovery easily accessible by the public, Gordon’s asser-
tion of falsity and deception were without merit, and his state CEMA 
claims were preempted by his failed federal CAN-SPAM claims. 
 
III. GORDON’S EFFECTS ON FUTURE SPAM LITIGATION 
 
The Gordon decision drew mixed reactions. Some lauded the Ninth 
Circuit for sweeping away frivolous litigation and sharpening CAN-
SPAM’s focus,43 while others criticized what they perceived as a      
                                                                                                             
36 See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1060-62 (citing Omega World Travel v. Mummagraph-
ics, 469 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
37 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1) (2006)). 
38 Id.  
39 Omega, 469 F.3d at 354-55. 
40 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.030 (2010). 
41 See Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575 F.3d 1040, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009). 
42 Id. 
43 See, e.g., Bruce Nye, CAN-SPAM Act–Common Sense From the Ninth Circuit, CAL 
BIZ LIT (Aug. 10, 2009, 9:19 AM), http://www.calbizlit.com/cal_biz_lit/2009/ 
08/canspam-act-common-sense-from-the-ninth-circuit.html; David Johnson, CAN-
SPAM Update: Ninth Circuit Ruling Shuts Down Anti-SPAM Cottage Industry, DIGITAL 
MEDIA LAWYER BLOG (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.digitalmedialawyerblog.com/ 
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weakening of anti-spam measures.”44 The debate centers on a widely     
disparate portrayal of Gordon himself; those in favor of the ruling 
viewed Gordon as an opportunistic litigant, while those against praised 
him as a scrupulous and canny anti-spam crusader. 
Whatever Gordon’s true motivations, the Ninth Circuit used a 
less-than-favorable view to assess his claims and formulate its holding.45 
Generally, the court sought to separate the actual law as codified in 
CAN-SPAM from sentiment as to what it should have been.46 The 
Ninth Circuit singularly emphasized the congressional intent behind 
CAN-SPAM in every part of its analysis, which has wide-ranging impli-
cations on private standing for future related litigation.47 
 
A.  Higher Threshold for Internet Access Service (IAS) Status 
 
As noted above, prior to Gordon, courts construed CAN-SPAM’s 
IAS definition broadly but inconsistently. While CAN-SPAM uses the 
definition of “Internet” from the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA),48 
it does not use the ITFA’s definition of either IAS or the more        
restricted “Internet access provider,” which specifically invoked hard-
ware-based Internet service providers (ISPs).49 Instead, it uses a much 
broader IAS definition50 from the Child Online Protection Act,51 
                                                                                                             
2009/08/digital_media_law_ninth_circui.html. 
44 See, e.g., J. Craig Williams, Prying Back The Lid On The CAN-Spam Act: No Pri-
vate Right To Challenge Spammers, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT (Aug. 9, 2009, 7:54 
AM), http://www.mayitpleasethecourt.com/journal.asp?blogid=2025. 
45 See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1055 (“It is readily apparent that Gordon, an individ-
ual who seeks out spam for the very purpose of filing lawsuits, is not the type of   
private plaintiff that Congress had in mind.”). 
46 Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1056 n.15 (“As should be apparent here, ‘the law’ that 
Gordon purportedly enforces relates more to his subjective view of what the law 
ought to be, and differs substantially from the law itself.”). 
47 See id. at 1057 (“The CAN-SPAM Act was enacted to protect individuals and 
legitimate businesses—not to support a litigation mill for entrepreneurs like Gor-
don.”). 
48 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
49 Id. 
50 See 15 U.S.C. § 7702(11) (2006). 
51 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(4) (2006). 
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which not only includes ISPs such as Comcast, and Verizon DSL, but 
also meta-level service providers.52 
Gordon carved out an exception to this broad definition by exclud-
ing professional litigants and other small-time private plaintiffs like 
blog owners or personal Web site operators. The court “reject[ed] any 
overly broad interpretation of ‘Internet access service’ that ignore[d] 
congressional intent,” which generally viewed CAN-SPAM as only   
applicable to those in the best position to regulate spam and not those 
who merely received it.53 Though the court refused to lay down any 
specific test, it advised that subsequent courts should “inquire into the 
plaintiff’s purported Internet-related service operations” in questiona-
ble cases and determine what purpose those operations served.54 Even 
if the operations were legitimate, their scale and complexity must be 
weighed; those providing a “nominal role in providing Internet-related 
services” cannot qualify.55 
The court used Gordon’s enterprise as an example of a non-IAS, 
even though it met CAN-SPAM’s literal IAS definition. On its face, 
this appears to violate the Ninth Circuit’s general precedent that “the 
legislative purpose of a statute is expressed by the ordinary meaning of 
the words used.”56 Gordon’s service appears to enable users to access  
e-mail, fitting squarely within the literal CAN-SPAM IAS definition. 
However, the Gordon court distinguished Gordon’s enterprise from 
IAS classification by noting its lack of value.57 It observed that Gordon 
failed to operate as a bona-fide e-mail provider; he “avoided taking 
even minimal efforts to avoid or block spam” and instead actively    
                                                                                                             
52 See Ethan Ackerman, Just Who Is an Internet Access Service Provider Under CAN-
SPAM?, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKETING LAW BLOG (Nov. 14, 2008, 1:29 AM), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2008/11/just_who_is_an.htm (asserting that 
Web sites like Facebook, Google, etc. also fall under the CAN-SPAM definition of 
IAS). 
53 Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575 F.3d 1040, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2009). 
54 Id. at 1055. 
55 See id. at 1052. 
56 Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, 154 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998); accord        
Seldovia Native Ass’n v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1990). 
57 See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1051-52. 
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accumulated it for the purposes of initiating litigation.58 The court also 
cited Gordon’s lack of involvement in the creation of his e-mail       
service, which was limited to using a home computer to access a much 
larger e-mail provider’s services.59 The court determined that Gordon’s 
service was not a service at all, as it did not provide users access to   
Internet resources beyond what was already available to them.60  
The Ninth Circuit’s decision sets the IAS threshold considerably 
higher, especially for professional plaintiffs. The decision’s effect on 
more legitimate enterprises is still unclear, however. There is little to 
distinguish the methods used to set up legitimate e-mail domains, 
blogs, etc.—some of which may attract thousands or millions of users—
from those employed by Gordon. The Ninth Circuit’s expressly in-
complete guidance on the matter suggests that it may have targeted 
Gordon’s dubious aims rather than the lack of complexity or utility of 
his methods.61  
The Ninth Circuit’s precedent creates a definitional continuum for 
IAS status, requiring fact-based inquiry to determine eligibility. On the 
one hand, services created specifically to enable litigation are categori-
cally ineligible. On the other hand, entities allowing primary access to 
the Internet itself or other legitimate Internet-based services—social 
networking and e-mail, for instance—are covered under IAS’ generally 
broad definition. The threshold is less clear for plaintiffs between the 
extremes, especially for those providing secondary services such as   
personal blogs or family e-mail domains.  
The Ninth Circuit’s rule of statutory construction seemingly cabins 
the Gordon IAS limitations to explicitly illegitimate or useless services. 
Had Gordon actually maintained legitimate e-mail services for his 
clients, the court’s analysis would have been a significantly closer 
proposition. Professional plaintiffs may begin “spam farming” more 
passively to avoid the elevated threshold. 
                                                                                                             
58 Gordon, 575 F.3d. at 1052. 
59 Id. 
60 See id. 
61 See Eric Goldman, An End to Spam Litigation Factories?, TECHNOLOGY AND 
MARKETING LAW BLOG (Aug. 7, 2009, 12:40 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ 
archives/2009/08/an_end_to_spam.htm. 
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B.  The “Adversely Affected” Test and Required Showing of Actual Harm 
 
Even if a private plaintiff can show bona-fide IAS status, under 
Gordon they must now show that they were both adversely affected by 
IAS-type harm and that the harm was real, with an extent beyond that 
of “mere annoyance . . . and greater than the negligible burdens typi-
cally borne by an IAS provider in the ordinary course of business.”62 
As before, the CAN-SPAM Act redresses only harms that parallel 
its limited private right of action, including harms unique to IAS   
providers such as “investing in new equipment to increase capacity[,] 
customer service personnel to deal with increased subscriber com-
plaints, [and] maintaining e-mail filtering systems and other anti-spam 
technology.”63 Gordon made it clear that consumer-related harms are 
irrelevant to CAN-SPAM analysis, not only neutralizing claims by    
private consumers, but also claims by IASs based partially or entirely 
on, for example, loss of personal data.64 Such claims must now seek 
redress for the derivative effects of consumer-related harms, such as 
additional customer service costs.65 
However, the calculation of adverse effect under CAN-SPAM now 
includes a baseline element. The Gordon court differentiates between 
the fixed and variable costs of spam prevention, and notes that subse-
quent courts must “be careful to distinguish the ordinary costs and 
burdens associated with operating an Internet access service from    
actual harm.”66 The court “expect[s] a legitimate service provider to   
secure adequate bandwidth and storage capacity and take reasonable 
precautions, such as implementing spam filters, as part of its normal 
operations.”67 The court seems to view spam as an expected part of the 
Internet industry, and any showing of actual harm for the purposes of 
CAN-SPAM standing must be above and beyond the normal expenses 
                                                                                                             
62 Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1054. 
63 Id. at 1053. 
64 Goldman, supra note 61. 
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required to counteract it.68 “Network slowdowns, server crashes,      
increased bandwidth usage, and hardware and software upgrades bear 
no inherent relationship to spam or spamming practices,” and        
evidence of them alone is insufficient to show that the IAS was        
adversely affected by misconduct.69 Such events must be accompanied 
with evidence that “the e-mails at issue . . . contribute to a larger,      
collective spam problem that cause ISP-type harms.”70 
This seems to imply that an influx of spam of an unusual amount 
or insidiousness, mapped to a specific and abnormal IAS-type harm, is 
required for private standing under CAN-SPAM. However, due to 
what the Ninth Circuit perceived as “the impracticability of tracing 
harm to a specific e-mail or batch of e-mails,” it refused to impose “a 
direct causation requirement,” though it reserved the right to do so in 
future litigation.71 
Gordon’s stricter private standing requirements are effectively 
waived for “well-recognized ISPs or plainly legitimate Internet access 
service providers.”72 It reasoned that “adequate harm might be pre-
sumed because any reasonable person would agree that such entities 
dedicate considerable resources to and incur significant financial costs 
in dealing with spam.”73 For these plaintiffs, standing under CAN-
SPAM is automatically granted. Conversely, harms alleged by plaintiffs 
with questionable IAS status should be “closely examine[d].”74 This 
language has the effect of bifurcating the “adverse effect” requirements 
for large commercial providers and smaller enterprises.75 It should be 
noted that Gordon left open the question of what characterizes a     
“recognized” ISP or a “plainly legitimate” IAS. 
As with its restriction of the IAS definition, the Gordon court’s 
holding on the CAN-SPAM harm elements invalidates most profes-
                                                                                                             
68 Goldman, supra note 61. 
69 Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1054. 
70 Id. 
71 Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1054 n.12. 
72 Id. at 1055. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Goldman, supra note 61. 
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sional litigants’ standing arguments. It also requires a higher standing 
threshold for private plaintiffs of all but the largest and most well   
recognized IASs. 
 
C.  CAN-SPAM Preempts Overlapping State Law 
 
Gordon’s application of Omega World Travel v. Mummagraphics is a 
definite statement of CAN-SPAM’s preemption of applicable state law. 
One of CAN-SPAM’s stated aims is to address the states’ disparate 
standards for commercial e-mail, which it found to be incompatible 
with the geographically independent nature of e-mail.76 However, in 
some states, CAN-SPAM’s enactment resulted in the creation of new 
anti-spam laws to work around the preemption statute, making enter-
prises like Gordon’s more successful because of the additional state law 
action at their disposal.77 These new laws were often more lax about 
standing and causation, sometimes focusing on the perpetrator’s know-
ledgeable intent of their actions rather than any actual harm suffered 
by recipients, and provided any private recipient or Web site owner 
with a right of action.78 
Just as the Omega decision invalidated these quickly-revised state 
laws in the Fourth Circuit, Gordon’s affirmation of Omega’s principles 
may negate similarly situated state laws in the Ninth Circuit, following 
its disqualification of Washington’s CEMA in Gordon. It is important 
to note that Gordon and Omega only interpret CAN-SPAM as preempt-
ing state laws specific to electronic mail; other laws, including statutes 
targeting fraud or computer crime, are still viable for litigation.79  
However, as Gordon demonstrated, such state claims must not be based 
on other, explicitly preempted grounds.80 
 
                                                                                                             
76 15 U.S.C. §7701(a)(11) (2006). 
77 See Goldman, supra note 61. 
78 See, e.g., State v. Heckel, 93 P.3d 189, 192-94 (Wash. App. 2004) (assessing  
defendant’s liability for violating Wash. Rev. Code 19.190.020 in terms of constructive 
knowledge of receipt). 
79 Gordon v. Virtumundo, 575 F.3d 1040, 1065 n.24 (9th Cir. 2009). 
80 See id. at 1064-65 n. 23. 
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D.  Prevailing Defendants May Be Awarded Attorney’s Fees 
 
Virtumundo was able to recover attorney’s fees from Gordon at the 
district court level. This may have been the first time a defendant had 
prevailed in collecting attorney’s fees in a CAN-SPAM action.81 The 
district court found that since CAN-SPAM was intended to have a  
limited private right of action, a dual-standard approach to attorney’s 
fees where plaintiffs’ requests are always viewed favorably was not    
appropriate.82 Congress’ intent, it reasoned, was not for “private      
parties with no harm to invoke CAN-SPAM [and] collect millions of    
dollars.”83 The district court concluded that CAN-SPAM was best 
suited for an even-handed approach under Fogerty, wherein a prevailing 
defendant’s request for remuneration would be “‘evaluated no         
differently than the question to whether to award fees to a prevailing 
plaintiff.’”84 Upon evaluating Gordon’s serial litigation tendencies, the 
district court found ample reason to award Virtumundo attorney’s fees 
with the “goal of deterrence.”85  
This novel reasoning was not addressed and thus not explicitly 
overruled by the Ninth Circuit. The district court turned professional 
litigation under CAN-SPAM into a much riskier financial proposition 
in the Western District of Washington; the Ninth Circuit’s silence on 




Gordon effectively neutralizes most professional plaintiffs’ standing 
arguments in the Ninth Circuit under CAN-SPAM’s private right of 
action. First, the threshold question of whether a plaintiff is an IAS 
                                                                                                             
81 Eric Goldman, CAN-SPAM Defendant Awarded $111k in Fees/Costs: Gordon v. 
Virtumundo, CIRCLEID (Aug. 6, 2007, 4:44 PM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/ 
070806_can_spam_act_gordon_virtumundo. 
82 Gordon v. Virtumundo, No. 06-0204-JCC, at *5-6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2007) 
(order granting attorney’s fees), available at http://www.spamnotes.com/files/31236-
29497/Virtumundo_Order.pdf. 
83 Id. at *7. 
84 Id. at *5 (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994)). 
85 Id. at *10. 
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involves close judicial scrutiny regarding its underlying purpose. 
Second, if the plaintiff is an IAS, it must show that it suffered signifi-
cant IAS-type harm above and beyond ordinary inconvenience from a 
normal spam volume. Third, should the plaintiff’s CAN-SPAM claim 
fail, the viability of a parallel state claim is now highly questionable. 
Finally, if the court determines that the claim is frivolous, the plaintiff 
runs the risk of being responsible for the defendant’s legal fees and 
costs. 
A side effect of the Ninth Circuit’s methodical dissolution of 
CAN-SPAM litigation factories is that legitimate Web site operators 
and e-mail providers have a higher standard of harm, and possibly 
threshold IAS standing, to meet. Large and well-known providers and 
operators, however, may automatically be presumed to have standing 




 Examine the legitimacy and motives of private plaintiffs. New 
Ninth Circuit CAN-SPAM standing requirements make it difficult 
for litigation factories to succeed in court. 
 Provide evidence of complexity, utility, and specialty. The more 
useful, involved, or unique the service provided by the plaintiff, 
the more likely they are to attain IAS status.  
 Emphasize omnipresence or legitimacy of the service. A showing of 
obvious legitimacy of the plaintiff’s service, or widespread recogni-
tion as an ISP, effectively bypasses the stringent “adversely affected 
by” requirements of the Ninth Circuit. 
 Concentrate on materially deceptive practices. Mere errors and 
technical glitches are not likely to meet the standard under either 
federal or state law. 
 Be prepared to defend against claims for attorney’s fees. If the de-
fendant prevails, it is possible that the court will use the Fogerty 
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